Now and Then: False Confessions, Beliefs, and Memories in the Modern and Early Modern Eras
David Begelman
Historians
widely assume that confessions of witchcraft across three centuries, from 1400
to 1700, were produced in an atmosphere of extreme pressure. Consequently,
scholarly efforts to establish the actual existence of witch cults through the
haze of forced testimony usually have been complicated for this reason (Cohn,
1975; Midelfort, 1974). It is less
clear how to account for confessions that were seemingly not created under
duress by secular or Inquisitorial courts. These involved a minority of women
who stepped forward to admit they were guilty of the crimen exceptum, ostensibly without
coercion: the voluntary witches. These accused had some significance for
witch-theorists of the era. Whatever residual doubts many of the latter may
have harbored about the reality of crimes or heresies for which suspects were
rounded up, the fact that some had volunteered to confess without external pressure
tended to erase lingering doubts about the veracity of the charges against
them. Thomas has provided a flavor of the kind of case in question: a certain
butcher, Meggs, who voluntarily traveled ten or twelve miles to be interrogated
by the witch finder Matthew Hopkins, and was later “duly executed as a witch”
(Thomas, 1971, pp. 518-519).
During
the era in question, a growing chorus of skeptics needed to reconcile the
existence of voluntary witches with presumptions about their innocence. One
route was to question whether unforced confessions were other than actually
voluntary, being effects of less visible social pressures. Accordingly, some
thought that ostensibly voluntary confessions might have been testimonies born
of subtle influences which, while short of torture, were nonetheless similar to
it in effect. For example, in the investigation of Basque witchcraft in
Logrono, Spain, the inquisitor Alonso de Salazar y Frias in 1614 posited just
such tacit influences on witch testimony. He felt that “free” confessions were
actually the consequence of subtle inquisitorial approaches. He pointedly
accused colleagues in his tribunal of “insinuating ideas into their [witches]
minds in various ways” by promising the accused they would be freed if they
owned up to their misdeeds (Baroja, 1965, p. 187; Henningsen, 1969; 1980).
During the Salem Village scare of 1692, all defendants who confessed to
witchcraft were spared execution. It would be difficult to plead voluntariness
of confession on the part of such defendants in a modern court of law,
especially if it could be established that the accused were aware of the
connection between confessing and avoiding the gallows—or being pressed to
death, as in the case of Giles Corey (Upham, 1867; Hansen, 1969).
Voluntary and Insane
Another
route to explaining the voluntary witch confession was to question the sanity
of the accused, a solution that reconciled the presumed falsity of witch
confessions with the absence of any inquisitorial or identifiable influence in
producing them. Johann Weyer, author of De
Praestigiis Daemonum in 1563, chose this second alternative, one that
comported well with the misogyny of the early modern period, since most of the
accused were women. Confessions of imaginary misdeeds were consistent with the
mental disarray caused by melancholia, as Weyer declared witches to have—with
or without the horrific incentives to confess arranged by governing bodies
(Mora, et.al., 1991).
While
cognizant of the questionable status of statements extracted under torture,
Weyer, like other demonologists of his time, took them in the main to be
faithful expressions of a witch’s belief about her Satanic powers. In Book VI,
Chapter XXIV of De Praestigiis Daemonum, Weyer
maintained that his opponents could never show that witches had concluded pacts
with demons, in part because of tainted voluntary confessions. One type is
“defective because after the fact the Devil impresses it upon the imaginations
of these poor women that they have done that which occurred naturally or that
which he himself brought about” (Mora, et. al., 1991, p. 549). Elsewhere in
Chapter XXIV, Weyer characterizes witches as “stupid, deluded, old women”
(Mora, et. al., p. 548).
One
assumption about voluntary confessions was that suspects who produced them
actually believed they were servants
of Satan. The hunch would be riskier had they confessed under torture. During
torture, one could argue that the confessor was only verbally compliant in
confirming inquisitorial scenarios of witchcraft. Under such circumstances, the
witch gave the inquisitor what he wanted to hear, rather than a concocted tale
she actually believed. On the other hand, the historian might maintain that the
only possible explanation for the voluntary witch not under suspicion until she
freely “confesses” is that despite the falsity of her testimony, she truly
believes her story. However, the modern understanding of voluntary confessions
makes the matter more complicated than this.
When
one compares early modern to contemporary jurisprudence, it becomes apparent
that an enormous shift has taken place in understanding the myriad factors that
may come to affect testimony. Today, we take for granted the vulnerability of
verbal reporting to a wide range of variables distorting it. As a result, the
relationship between testimony and the reality it uncovers is for us no longer
the straightforward affair it was for an early modern jurist. Tribunals during
that time took it for granted that confessions extracted under torture were
trustworthy. Today, such procedures virtually epitomize the reasons for
distrusting the disclosures they produce. Currently, we know that influences
far less egregious than torture can influence testimony. How much less before a
point of diminished confidence in it should develop is an extraordinarily
complex issue. In the last analysis, only forensic studies can supply the
answer, and not overnight.
Voluntariness
Complex
slants on the analysis of voluntariness have a modern provenance. For example,
in Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of
Mental Health, 42 U.S.L. Week, 2063 (Michigan Circuit Court, Wayne City,
July 10, 1973), the “voluntariness” of a decision to undergo psychosurgery is
abridged merely by the fact that a patient has been committed to an institution
by the court. Here, whether or not the act is “voluntary” has nothing to do
with the character of specific procedures aimed at ensuring informed consent,
the particular state of mind of the patient at the point of agreeing to the
procedure, or any other local influences impacting a decision to accept it. The
court declared that involuntarily committed patients “live in an inherently
coercive institutional environment” (Martin, 1975, p. 172). Accordingly,
decisions to accept institutional psychosurgery even when informed can never be
legally “voluntary.”
Cases
like Kaimowitz strike an interesting
note in the concept of the voluntary act. They commemorate junctures at which
complexities in its analysis drive a sometime wedge between the psychological
and legal definitions of “voluntary.” That is, under Kaimowitz, behavioral science or the social psychology of
decision-making is largely irrelevant to whether a decision to undergo
psychosurgery is truly voluntary: it is institutional status alone that
determines this, according to the ruling. In other words, the decision of an
institutionally committed patient to submit to the procedure is always
“involuntary,” independently of what we know about the psychology, mental
state, or behavior of the individual or his supervisors.
When
Kassin and Wrightsman aver that “Voluntariness is a difficult concept to
operationalize since it requires inference about the suspect’s subjective state
of mind” (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985, p. 70), their view is plausible only
when it pertains to the psychological
arena of discourse. In the legal
arena, “voluntariness” can never be operationalized, any more than can “due
process,” because the concept is forensically open-textured (Waismann, 1963).
That is, its meaning will shift as a function of its legal history, often
independent of the growth of knowledge in the social sciences. While the latter
may be relied on to inform the law, it can never define the latter. As it turns
out, the addiction to the probative value of the verbal confession—however
produced—is not a bias restricted to the early modern period. It is the
hallmark of contemporary police investigations as well (Ratner, 1983; Huff,
Rattner & Sagarin, 1996).
False Confessions
Contemporary
experts in the psychology of false confessions are careful to distinguish cases
in which the falsity of testimony is obvious from the larger category of cases
in which falsity may be entertained only as a plausible hypothesis. The latter
supposition springs from our current state of knowledge about predictor
variables that have been demonstrated to contaminate testimony, making it
unreliable—whether or not a crime suspect confesses or is convicted by a court.
In obvious cases, it is only a matter of logic that when over two hundred individuals
confessed to the kidnapping of the Charles Lindbergh baby, all but one—or
possibly several on the assumption of more than one conspirator—of these
confessions were patently false (Note, 1953). Likewise, numerous voluntary but
obviously false confessions were lodged in the case of the “Blue Dahlia” murder
in which the mutilated body of an aspiring actress was discovered in a vacant
lot in Los Angeles (Ellroy, 1987; Gilmore, 1994). More recently, the voluntary
false confession of John Mark Karr in the murder of Jonbenet Ramsey was given
widespread media coverage. In other types of cases, such as the Central Park
jogger case of 1989 (Ryan, 1989; Kassin, et. al., 2005) or the Michael Crowe
case in 1999 (Sauer, 2002), false confessions resulted in the arrest or
imprisonment of individuals subsequently declared innocent on the basis of
either DNA evidence or the coercive tactics of arresting officials in
extracting confessions.
Because
many unknown variables come into play in confessions of crimes, social scientists
have pointed out that there is no current way of calculating the incidence or
prevalence of false confessions (Kassin, 2001). Unless human nature has changed
radically from the early modern time-frame, there is no reason to assume that
witch confessions were any less vulnerable to the effects of variables
contaminating present day testimony.
The
witchcraft historian has one advantage over the contemporary social scientist:
all witch confessions of maleficia and
diabolism were false, not merely on the basis of how they were extracted, but
also on account of their thematic content. Despite their testimony, voluntary
or otherwise, witches didn’t fly through the air, shapeshift, or wreak
magically sourced harm on neighbors, not to mention possess other supernatural
capacities attributed to them. Accordingly, for the historian, unlike the
modern investigator, quandaries over the determination of actual guilt or
innocence do not nowadays arise as they did in the past. When Thomas insists
that “historians who dismiss the whole notion of witchcraft as groundless are
mistaken” his remark was not intended to endorse the reality of maleficia, but simply to give credence
to the idea that “however fabricated the confessions extracted from them, at
least some of the witches felt genuine hatred for those around them” (Thomas,
1971, p. 523). Such witch sentiments, together with the occasional coincidence
of imprecation and misfortune, could create an illusion of diabolical power. In
fact, the accidental contingency between a ritual and external happenstance
reinforced the belief in magic and sorcery, black or white. Without the
imagined connection, there would have been no belief in witchcraft, any more
than there would be a practice of medicine without ill health [i]
.
In
categorizing false confessions, Kassin (1997) and Kassin and Wrightsman (1985)
have developed a tripartite framework: the voluntary confession (V), the
coerced compliant confession (C), and the coerced internalized confession (I).
The first of these types involves false testimony of a self-incriminating kind
that is supplied without any external pressure, as in the case of the voluntary
witch. Thomas’s example of the unsolicited confession of the butcher Meggs is
probably such a case, as is the over 200 confessors to the Lindbergh baby
abduction. Establishing a true (V) confession provides no guarantee the suspect
in question, witch or otherwise, believes
his or her own testimony. There are enough contemporary instances of
voluntary confessions in which individuals provide testimony they could not
have believed was true, and which was disclosed for a variety of reasons other
than personal conviction about its veracity. Some of these include craving
attention (Wrightsman & Kassin, 1993), the wish to impress friends
(Radelet, et. al., 1992), or the wish to protect friends or relatives
(Gudjonsson, 1992).
The
second type of case, (C), are those confessions extracted under extreme
conditions in which the testimony is produced in order to avoid an aversive
state of affairs like torture, or to secure some reward or social enhancement,
but where the suspect knows he or she is innocent of the charges involved. This
type of case may characterize most instances of accused witches during the
early modern period, although how many is difficult to determine in retrospect
without assessing the percentage involving the (V) and (I) types. The (I) cases
are those in which a suspect comes to actually believe the charges lodged
against her, incorporating the outlook on her actions adopted by her
interrogators.
Kassin
and Wrightsman’s classification of cases has been subject to criticism on the
grounds that it mischaracterizes the features of confessions over time (Ofshe
and Leo, 1997). However, such a criticism may well confuse the usefulness of a
taxonomic scheme with the predictable characteristics of the confession types
it classifies. Thus, should it transpire that the internalized beliefs of (I)
confessions are temporary and fail to persist unchanged over time, this finding
does not impugn the legitimacy of the original taxonomy; it only furthers
empirical knowledge of its subcategories. Fine-tuning information about a
probable course of events within a class is not tantamount to claiming
misplacement in a superordinate category.
Coerced Compliant Confessions
An
oft cited example of the (C) case is that of Johannes Junius, Burgomaster of
Bamberg, Germany. In 1628 this “witch” signed a confession after being put to
the question and subjected to thumbscrews, leg vises (Beinschrauben), and eight hoistings on the strappado (Robbins,
1959). This procedure involved hoisting a suspect by the arms tied behind the
back so that shoulder joints are wrenched in unbearable agony. The latter was
sometimes enhanced by attached weights to the feet before hoisting.
We can with some confidence classify Junius’s
confession as the coerced compliant (C) type because he managed to have a
letter he wrote to his daughter Veronica smuggled out of prison. It went on at
great length how brutal methods were responsible for his confession, a
concocted tale of relations with and baptism by the Devil, attendance at a
sabbat (i.e., witches’ conventicle), cavorting with a succubus named “Vixen,”
nightflying on animals, and other boilerplate witchcraft scenarios. The note to
his daughter admonished her to get out of town for her own safety, informing
her that “Innocent have I come into prison, innocent have I been tortured,
innocent must I die. For whoever comes into the witch prison must become a
witch or be tortured until he invents something out of his head” (Robbins,
1959, p. 292).
Coerced Internalized Confessions
In
the third type of case, the coerced-internalized type (I), the suspect comes to
believe in the veracity of the charges against him or her. A risk in
documenting this type of witchcraft case centers around complexities in
establishing a suspect’s self-belief after interrogation, and the possibility
of mistakenly confusing true belief with verbal compliance merely, or a (C)
case. The paradigm of the (I) case in the witchcraft literature is widely
acknowledged to be that of the benandanti
(the “do-gooders”), an alleged agrarian group of peasants whose existence in
the late sixteenth century was unearthed by Ginzburg (1991; 1992)[ii].
The group resided in Friuli near Udine in northeast Italy. Benandanti were born with a caul, or amniotic sac they later wore
as an amulet. Elsewhere in Europe, the caul as a harbinger of special status
took on other meanings. In Slavic countries, it augured becoming a werewolf
(Ginzburg, 1991, p. 155).
Curiously,
the benandanti, predominantly men,
fancied themselves adversaries of witches, predominantly women, although the
ranks of the latter were reportedly peopled by minority wizards. Benandanti testified that armed with
fennel stalks they rode into battle against the witches at night on the backs
of animals. The outcome of these engagements four times annually during the
Ember days forecast the following year’s crop yield. A failure of the campaign
against the witches would mean low yield and famine.
Ginzburg’s
exercise in micro-history has been singled out as the only evidence for a
European witch cult in the immense literature on the subject. Midelfort has
stated: “Ginzburg’s benandanti remain
to date the only authenticated witch cult in early modern Europe” (Midelfort,
1974, p. 204). Russell contended that the cult was solid proof regarding the
existence of witchcraft (Russell, 1972). Both historians may have since
modified this opinion.
Benandanti have been widely characterized
as suspects who, at the instigation of the Inquisition, became convinced that
they were in fact heretics and witches, and not the heroic brigades they had
originally styled themselves to be. If so, they exemplify the (I) confessional
type, or testifiers who come to believe the guilt urged on them by their
interrogators. However, it is difficult to determine whether benandanti conversion was authentically
(I) when it might have exemplified (C) for reasons already outlined. That is,
what scholars take to be conversions of the beliefs of benandanti about their status from anti-witch to witch may have
been collusion on the part of witnesses to verbally appease inquisitors out of
the fear of consequences. When first interrogated, one benandante, feeling the accusation that he was a witch was absurd,
laughed in the faces of his interrogators. Some historians would have us
believe that just because this suspect subsequently became verbally compliant,
he was no longer laughing on the inside.
When
Maria Panzona in 1618 admitted that her evening escapades were actually
witches’ sabbaths, did she really believe this, or was she merely placating
sponsors of regurgitated inquisitorial scenarios forced upon her? That the latter mind-set prevailed is
suggested by the fact that on the verge of seeming to undergo an (I)
conversion, Maria recanted, reverting to benandante
palaver. One can thus surmise the (C) flavor of her retraction. Might the
same have been true for other benandanti were
it not for their fear of inquisitorial consequences? For example, one accused benandante, Olivo Caldo, completely
recanted his testimony in a private audience with a bishop’s representative
after he attempted to hang himself in his cell on January 2, 1645. He insisted
everything he said during his trial he said “…out of fear and dread of the law,
and that he really thought that in this way he might more easily and quickly
free himself from the toils of justice” (Ginzburg, 1966, p. 139).
On
the subject of English witchcraft, Thomas has indicated that even innocent
suspects might come to believe their guilt under pressure of interrogation
(Thomas, 1971, p. 526). The conversion on occasion perhaps occurred. However,
it is one thing to allow for this possibility and quite another to prove it
happened. We need more than verbal compliance to confirm this; we need evidence
he or she actually believed in the testimony—or disconfirming indications of
dissembling under pressure, as was the case for (C) victims like Johannes
Junius and Olivo Caldo.
On
the contemporary scene, the problem of distinguishing (C) from (I) confessions
is also rife. For example, Barthel (1976) cites the case of Peter Reilly, an 18
year-old who found his mother murdered after returning home. Suspicions of
matricide on the part of the police led to interrogations involving deceptive
procedures assuring the suspect of his guilt. Reilly eventually acceded to the
pressure to sign a confession, although subsequent evidence proved his
innocence. Kassin and Wrightsman classify the case as an (I) one, presumably on
the basis of Reilly’s making such statements as “Well it really looks like I
did it” (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985, p. 78). However, the classification as
a coerced internalized confession appears to rest on, inter alia, interpretations of Reilly’s responses as (I) rather
than (C)-tinctured. That is, Reilly might have capitulated only verbally, and
in order to end an otherwise aversive questioning session. Moreover, the
appropriate categorization of Reilly’s confession has implications for Ofshe
and Leo’s (1997) criticism of the Kassin and Wrightsman tripartite
classification scheme. As was mentioned, they fault the scheme in part because
of the tendency for (I) beliefs to degrade over time, reverting to
pre-interrogation beliefs. However, the latter process might be indicative of
the fact that many, if not most, (I) beliefs may have been miscategorized in
the first place. In short, if (I) confessors subsequently revert, it may have
been the case that they were (C) cases to begin with, rather than cases in
which self-belief was altered in the direction of the allegations in question.
As was mentioned, Ofshe & Leo’s theory of (I)-case reversion has no
implication for the legitimacy of the tripartite scheme. Even in the hypothetical
event (I) confessions were actually non-existent, being covert (C) types, the
scheme would still be a valid one—on the assumption (I) confessions could be
categorized as such should they in future occur. The problem here is not the
legitimacy of a taxonomy, but the precise determination of confession types
thus classified under it.
Altered States
Benandanti, when questioned by the Inquisition, testified that the night
battles were on the spiritual, not the physical plane, a distinction with some
importance in the wider literature on witchcraft, especially in attempts to
reconcile night flights to sabbats over enormous distances. Excursions in dream
states are a culture-bound pattern around the world quite familiar to
anthropologists. Because the night battles were reportedly conducted in an
“ecstatic” state, commentators have hastily concluded that this meant that benandanti were subject to catalepsies
(Cohn, 1975), a somewhat shaky inference. The supposition requires a more
unique or sharply defined psychological state: suspended animation, in which
the voluntary control of musculature ceases.
However, it is difficult to assess whether the night battles were (a)
simply a culturally reinforced myth among a loosely connected group of
individuals unified through the possession of cauls to which they attributed
magical properties; (b) an actual trance-state or altered state of
consciousness given narrative substance by the shamanistic folklore surrounding
it, or (c) accounts heavily colored, if not often created, by the inquisitorial
process. While (c) cannot be reconciled with the fact that inquisitors began
their interrogation of benandanti
only after receiving rumors of their activities, it may be naïve to suppose
that details of such disclosures to inquisitors were unaffected by close
questioning over repeated occasions.
That
the first of these hypotheses is more plausible than the second is suggested by
the fact that the combined motif of the night battle, animal transformations
and transvection, cauls, predominantly male combatants, and ecstatic states was
a pan-European theme extending far beyond the boundaries of the Friuli region.
As a related albeit different motif, Wilson (1963) and Bourguignon (1972)
reference the African Nyakyusa tribe,
where the counterparts of benandanti,
the abamanga, battle witches in
dreams. While such isomorphisms may indeed be the result of “semi-erased
historical relationships” (Ginzburg, 1991, p. 195), it may be a stretch to
imagine independent cultural groups fantasizing quite similar things because of
the effects of hallucinogenic properties of ergot or the mushroom claviceps purpurea. Ginzburg broaches
this theory, only to aver it lacks confirmation due to the absence of
etymologically loaded derivations (Ginzburg, 1991, p. 303-307).
If benandanti
accounts of ecstatic night battles were obviously not reality-based, it
begs the question to assume that battles on the “spiritual” plane impose
obligations on scholars to unpack them as catalepsies—or any other obscure psychiatric
condition—as if the spiritual state once reified requires grounding in an
exotic psychological reality other than shared folk belief, dreaming, or
reverie, or was drenched in more veracity than nightflying itself. An
alternative assumption is that surviving folkloric tales are remnants of
systems with largely ideational,
rather than experiential components.
Contemporary Christian evangelicals may give accounts of being “saved” without
any transformative experience necessarily grounding such ideas. Once the
questionable assumption of an altered state of consciousness is granted, it
becomes easy for the scholar to fetch around for exotic neurological categories
to rise to the task of connecting the dots. On the subject of the witch,
Ginzburg asserts: “It seems reasonable to suppose…that if not all, at least
some of the confessed witches, used unguents capable of inducing states of
hallucination and delirium” (Ginzburg, 1966, p. 17). On a somewhat different
note, he insists that the riddle of the benandanti
cannot be resolved by pharmacology or psychiatry (Ginzburg, 1966, p. 18).
On
the contemporary scene, a modern variation of the witchcraft theme appeared to
characterize the confessions of Paul Ingram that he had sexually abused his two
daughters in a ritualistic manner (Ofshe, 1992; 1994; Wright, 1994). The
testimony of Ericka and Julie Ingram contained wildly implausible allegations
against their father, including accounts of incest, group sex, cannibalism, and
infanticide at Satanic rituals. The allegations mirrored older scenarios, since
they were identical to those surfacing in early modern witch narratives based
upon confessions we know to be false. The case has stirred up considerable
controversy as to Ingram’s actual guilt or innocence, with social psychologists
emphasizing the latter, and judges, police, and juries siding with the former
verdict.
Several
commentators, in arguing a case for Ingram’s innocence, maintain that his false
confession was in part produced by a “hypnotic state,” “dissociative state,” or
“trance” his interrogators induced in him (Ofshe, 1992; Wright, 1994; Kassin,
1995). The assumption may have served to explain why an ostensibly (I)
confession was produced so readily. However, given the atmosphere of pressured
questioning, the social context, and the implicit task demands of the
interrogations, there may be a more parsimonious explanation of the Ingram
confessions without recourse to altered states differing from ordinary
principles effecting belief change.
Ingram’s
confession that he forced his son and daughter to have sex together was a
fiction implanted through a suggestion by Richard Ofshe as an aspect of an
experiment to demonstrate Ingram’s suggestibility. Yet Ingram produced the
confession in written form when alone in his cell, when he was not subject to
the artificial influences presumably responsible for his supposed “trances.”
Are we therefore obliged to assume that Ingram went into states of
self-hypnosis whenever “trances” were needed to account for his confessions?
False
confessions produced under pressured police interrogations are rarely
attributed to “hypnotic,” “dissociative,” or “trance” states in suspects. It is
therefore puzzling why the Ingram case should rely on them any more than do
other confessional scenarios. In this connection, prior to questioning Ingram
was of a religious persuasion that not only acknowledged the existence of the
living Devil, but his capacity to deceive humankind in devious ways. He also
indicated he believed implicitly in the honesty of the two daughters who
accused him of crimes against them, and was probably aware of tales of Satanic
cult activity and alleged victims who recovered repressed memories of horrific
abuse at its hands. With these loaded preconceptions, together with an
interrogation process by police, pastors, and psychologists forming an insular
information-processing system, one need not resort to altered states of
consciousness to explain why a subject asked to imagine what he might have done to his children, starts
confusing his imaginings with actual events.
In
the Paul Ingram case, the confusion between true memory and confabulation may
not have been enabled by the failure to discriminate differences between the
two. Tellingly, when Ingram’s wife, Sandy, began producing similar “Satanic”
narratives, she indicated she could differentiate the sensorily charged
imaginings of these narratives from the ordinary memories of her past. She told
Ofshe she could “see” and “smell” things in the narratives, unlike the mundane
memories of her life (Wright, 1994, pp. 141-142). Wright’s account of the
Ingram affair in Remembering Satan possesses
a running reality eerily out of keeping for a reporter supplying information at
a considerable distance from the events in question.
At
any rate, the assumption of an altered state of consciousness in Ingram was
inferential, not demonstrated. This remains so despite the inclusion of
“relaxation” techniques and “guided imagery” brought to bear on eliciting
information during his interrogation. The latter technique was found in one
study to be among the armamentaria of procedures in fully one quarter of
psychotherapists polled (Poole, et. al., 1995). The remaining complication for
altered state theories is the necessity of distinguishing underlying
differences among “hypnosis,” “trance,” and “dissociation.” Some investigators
have even held that there is little rigorous evidence such “altered states”
embody principles any different from ordinary states of expectation, task
demand, or relaxation (Spanos, 1987).
Cults
There
are several other facets of benandanti
confessions deserving of commentary. One is the assumption that benandanti formed an agrarian cult. The term “cult” is not precisely defined by
Ginzburg, although its use would seem to imply organized sect membership in
which votaries have connections to one another and, possibly, a hierarchy.
There is a world of difference between tales that undergo thematic deformations
from benign fertility mythology into stereotyped inquisitorial scenarios of
witchcraft, and the existence of actual cultic entourages involving ceremonial
activities. Folk beliefs, however novel from the standpoint of inquisitors
forever on the lookout for material to redact as heretical practice, were
prevalent across the European landscape. It is to Ginzburg’s credit that he has
traced their character and unusual affinities with ingenuity. Nonetheless, his
evidence of an agrarian “cult,” however defined, is not always compelling. One
wonders whether Ginzburg’s use of the term implies much more than he is willing
to grant. In a reply to one critic, he demurs from having stated that benandanti “actually assembled in
ecstatic nocturnal gatherings,” and that there was no evidence for actual
rituals (Ginzburg, 1991). Much of his data depends upon hearsay accounts of
people who, with several exceptions in The
Night Battles, are marginally identified from 1570 to 1650.
Testimonies,
often reportedly extracted in inquisitorial contexts brimming with auras of
pressured questioning, mark a shifting and inconsistent picture of benandanti belief, ritual, and practice.
One problem is whether the testimony represents a body of historical data from
which a unique sect of believers can be inferred. Cases are trotted out that
are a patchwork of similarities and differences. For example, in 1692, a
Livonian by the name of Theiss made a confession in court that bears striking
similarities to benandanti tales of
night battles with witches over crop fertility. Except Theiss fancied himself a
werewolf (wahrwolff) who made
journeys to hell to take on the Devil as well as witches in battle. Yet Ginzburg does not classify Theiss as a benandante, unlike Maria Panzona of
Latisana, whom he does—despite the fact that her account included homage to a
woman called “the abbess,” who sat on the edge of a well in the field of
Josephat. Maria’s talents did not stop
there; she had the capacity to turn herself into a black cat, and when younger,
accompany her godfather in the form of a butterfly to precincts of heaven and
hell. Nor does Ginzburg deny cult
membership to a cowherd from the same region as Maria, Menichino, who, unlike
other benandanti, ventured out at
night in the form of smoke to battle the witches. If smoking benandanti and butterflies are entitled to class membership, why
aren’t hairy, growling creatures with similar portfolios granted the same
inclusion?
One
suspect assured inquisitors that the banner of witches is of red silk, with
four gilded black devils; another insisted the banner was yellow. Benandanti were committed to defeating
witches in battles at night during the Ember season, but death tolls were never
mentioned—possibly because attacks by fennel stalks or sorghum stalks wielded
by witches led only to minor contusions. Benandanti
and witches, declared enemies,
seemed unusually chummy on return visits from battle, described by suspects as
a combination of play and war. Benandanti
expressed fear of divulging names of witches for fear of being beaten black and
blue, an apprehension that curiously evaporated on the battlefield. Carousing
between benandanti and witches seemed
to be the order of the day on returns from combat. Witches were reportedly more
parched than their adversaries, and if pails of water were not left at doorsteps
to slake their thirst, they invaded cellars to spill wine—or, as one might
expect from a perverse lot, urinate in the casks.
Of
some 850 accused between 1580 and 1634, only two benandanti, Paolo Gasparutto and Battista Moduco, come to life in
Ginzburg’s The Night Battles, and we
are able to glimpse stretches of their testimony, including verbatim
transcripts appended at the end of the author’s tract. The transcripts bear all
the signs of the pressured tactics familiar in contemporary research on police
interrogation and confessions.
Diagnosing Confession Types
There
is a complacent assumption on the part of certain historians that they are able
to spot the difference between the three types of confession through a
cursory—and inevitably distant—scrutiny of the context in which they were
produced. But the contemporary scientific challenge, as many psychologists have
come to realize, is to question this discernment. The problem in distinguishing
(V) from (C) confessions is making sure that any factor, however subtle or unnoticed, does not contaminate
voluntary testimony, pushing it into another category. The problem in
distinguishing (C) from (I) testimony is the knotty problem of establishing
actual self-belief, so that misclassifications are avoided. For example, Cohn
(1975) quotes Crawford (1967) as insisting that:
Any suggestion that the alleged witches were forced to
confess is, I think, belied by the very nature of the confessions themselves.
Forced confessions are generally grudgingly made and retracted as soon as the
threat is removed. The confessions in [this case] were not of this nature and
were first made in front of a definitely skeptical European policeman and then
repeated or admitted in front of a European magistrate and later a European judge.
As far as one can tell there is no reason to suppose that the police brought
any pressure to bear on these people (Cohn, 1975, p. 222).
Crawford
was not privy to the confessions, so he was in no position to rule on variables
influencing the testimony—or the actual beliefs—of the suspects in question. In
all likelihood, he identifies the idea of “force” with thumbscrews or
strappados (or the threat to use them), and the alleged “skepticism” of
policemen with, possibly, their official reassurance they always question
witnesses with an “open mind.” Contemporary research has shown that a
policeman’s approach to questioning and even the characteristics of the room in
which a suspect is interrogated, not to mention many other overlooked factors,
like the promise of a light sentence, ethnic status, intellectual limitations,
and sympathetic questioning can produce false confessions. Benandanti Paolo Gasperutto and Battista Moduco were given
suspended sentences after confessing to “witchcraft” on the promise of “being
received and treated with mercy” (Ginzburg, 1992, p. 153).
The
concept of “force” underwent intriguing deployment during the early modern
period. It was often identified with extreme forms of torture, as in the German
persecutions (Midelfort, 1990), whereas in England “torture” was forbidden,
although witch suspects were routinely subject to interrogations involving
prickings, sleep-deprivation, blindfolding, and binding suspects cross-legged
on stools (Hole, 1947; Briggs, 1966). The sometime English slant on witch
confessions that they weren’t “forced” because “torture” was repudiated is
transparently fallacious in the light of modern research findings.
The Problem of Belief
Several
historians feel that the reliance on the confession of guilt stemmed from the
fact that witchcraft was an invisible
crime, so that a correspondingly greater emphasis was placed on the verbal
testimony of the witch as proof of her malfeasance. This viewpoint may have
been overstressed. In important ways, witchcraft wasn’t usually a hidden crime.
With the exception of such diabolical intimacies as the pact with the Devil,
its publicity was highlighted by victims who testified to their bewitchment,
possession, or spectral visitations by the accused witch. Second, across centuries
there has been an underlying social assumption that the royal road to
determining inner belief is its verbal expression. Accordingly, the fancied
connection between spoken words and guilt is taken to be so close, it overrides
all other considerations. On the basis of mock jury experimental research,
investigators report that people commonly find it difficult to believe anyone
would confess to a crime he or she did not commit (Kassin & Wrightsman,
1980; 1981).
On
the modern scene, the emphasis laid on the probative value of the verbal
confession during police interviews prevails over other types of evidence—even
when crimes are not so invisible. Where physical evidence is available, it is
often not gathered and subject to forensic analysis. Horvath and Meesig (1996)
reviewed studies of criminal investigations and found that gathering physical
evidence was achieved in less than 10% of reviewed cases. Even at that, the
evidence thus gathered was subjected to analysis in only about half those
cases.
The
vagaries of determining actual belief are not limited to suspected witches from
whom confessions were extracted. Questions also arise about beliefs harbored by
inquisitors, especially during the task of interrogation. On the one hand,
witch theorists of yesteryear attributed to witches far-reaching magical powers
to destroy, wrack with pain, blind, bewitch, make impotent, cast glamors (i.e.,
make penises disappear), sicken, and otherwise possess innocent victims. On the
other hand, inquisitors went about their business of interrogation as if they
were virtually immune to these fearsome blights. Yet there is ample evidence
the witch-theorist was not completely insensitive to the pitfalls of
approaching suspects. For example, the principal witch-treatise of the fifteenth
century, the Malleus Maleficarum (Part
III, Question 15), cautions inquisitors to avoid the gaze of suspects lest
their power to sway the judge from his holy task prevail. It also recommends
witches be led into interrogation backwards for the “protection” of
inquisitors. There are other minor precautions recommended in the manual, such
as avoiding physical contact with the accused, and carrying consecrated salt
and herbs enclosed in a wax seal stamped with the Agnus Dei. It remains a mystery why the cautionary approach to
interrogation stops there, if the witch is by reputation invested with so many
dangerous powers. Were these ignored by inquisitors approaching alleged
mine-fields of diabolical perversity, or was actual inquisitorial belief about the witch’s power to
afflict them during interrogation half-hearted, contradictory, or non-existent?
It is one thing to be unwisely complacent about being struck blind, and quite
another to have little apprehension this is possible. Stephens (2002) has conjectured
that a crisis of belief in the actual reality of witchcraft on the part of
witch-theorists as notable as the authors of the Malleus Maleficarum was the driving motivation behind their
preoccupation with proving the reality of carnal relations between demons and
witches
Inquisitorial Style
At
the trial of the wife of Jean Rose of Villars-Chabod in Savoy in 1477, the
suspect was interrogated on September 9, and accused of attending sabbats, an
allegation she denied. She was thereupon given a monition followed by two
others before being returned for questioning on September 14. She was told she
must admit her crimes on that date, or the inquisitorial process would move
forward. An audience was held on September 15, when she was confronted with the
names of five other suspects whom she knew. She asserted they were of good
reputation, and she had no antagonism towards them. She was then presented with
the name of Massetus Garini, reportedly a suspect who had been executed for
heresy, and who named her as an accomplice. She stated she knew him, and there
was no enmity between them. Put to another question, she denied she ever cured
children and animals by magical charms. The fiscal (i.e., inquisitorial
attorney) present asked the tribunal to condemn the witness to torture, after
which she was taken to a chamber and hung by strappado for half an hour. On
October 20, the witness was again brought before the tribunal and pressured to
confess. She once more denied the charges. The fiscal in attendance again
demanded reinstatement of torture, which was granted. After a short duration of
this treatment, the suspect exclaimed she would confess if the torture was
stopped. When hauled before the same tribunal, however, she once more denies
the veracity of the allegations. Her case was continued to the next day. When
brought before her accusers, she confessed to attending a witch’s sabbat where
a mixed company of heretics were dancing backwards. Other infamies admitted
were paying homage to the Devil, renouncing the faith, receiving a pot of money
from the demon as well as a pole 18 inches long and some ointment which, when
rubbed on the pole, could transport her to witches’ conventicles. Her
confession was reconfirmed on October 22 along with supplying the names of 13
others, and in requestioning on October 23 she named yet four more accomplices
(Lea, 1957, pp. 238-239).
The
foregoing inquisitorial process was characteristic of many confessional
scenarios. It also captures the inquisitorial presumption of guilt, in sundry
trials one overriding any considerations of innocence standing in the way of
demonstrating a preordained truth. The inquisitorial model was presumed to cut
through the verbal camouflage thrown up by the devious ways of the Devil. And
here we have one take on the connection between confession and guilt or
self-belief not only driving the conviction of many early modern inquisitors,
but contemporary police interrogations as well. It is a theory that
single-mindedly sweeps away as trivia all facts deflecting attention away from
the crowning significance of what a suspect is eventually brought to say about a crime—irrespective of
context. The verbal confession as a criterion of guilt or inner belief is the
smoking gun, however extracted (Kassin, 2001).
There
were, of course, broad exceptions to the picture of free-wheeling intentions to
convict a witch at any cost. Witch-manias saw as many variations on approaches
to demonstrating guilt as does our own era. The historical distortion that
most, if not all, accused witches were eventually executed does violence to the
actual record, both in America and abroad. Even during the most ferocious
European witch panics, the percentage of convictions out of the total number of
accusations and subsequent trials for witchcraft averaged only around fifty per
cent (Levack, 1987; Katz, 1992). In Salem Village, 162 persons were accused of
witchcraft. Of these only seventy six were tried, but only 30 convicted
(Levack, 1987, p. 162). Godbeer has shown that the juridical approach to
investigating witchcraft in Stamford, Connecticut, during the same time-frame
as the Salem Village, Massachusetts trials in 1692, was much more skeptical and
experimental in nature than the latter (Godbeer, 2005).
Deliberations
of many juries across the Continent and in America considering cases against
alleged witchcraft involved sifting carefully through the evidence for the crimen exceptum. This was not always the
uncomplicated affair we might imagine it to have been. The approach was often
judicially painstaking and systematic, minute attention being given to
distinguishing natural causes from demonological influence. Jurists often
wracked their brains over determining which of the two was playing the
essential role. Hence, there grew to be an obsessive reliance on “signs” that
would clinch the issue and remove uncertainty. These included the Devil’s mark,
the supernumerary nipple, the rejection by water, the testimony of neighbors,
an accused family member or members (Midelfort, 1990), and most decisively, the
confession—however extracted. Considering the amazing array of approaches to
witchcraft, it appears to be a historical distortion to collapse the era in
question uniformly into a mindless juggernaut of terror and unthinking
superstition. It is also ironic that while many contemporaries profess horror
at the barbarity of inquisitorial procedure, they appear to share with their
early modern counterparts an enthusiasm for extracting confessions of guilt—at
whatever cost to innocence or justice.
False Memories
The
phrase “false memory” is ubiquitous in modern commentary on questionable
testimony, therapeutic disclosures, and confessions. One wonders whether it has
overextended its reach due to a conceptual sprawl that often obscures necessary
distinctions among psychological processes or mechanisms. It would appear that
in several arenas of discussion, distortions that creep into accounts of past
events may have nothing to do with vagaries of memory, but alterations of belief. Examples might suffice to illustrate the
confusion.
Possible
misattributions of “false memory” in court cases was apparent in the case of
John Demjanjuk, a Ukrainian born retired automotive employee who had been
working in Cleveland, Ohio. He was deported to Israel, tried and sentenced to
death for the destruction of hundreds of thousands of Jews at the Treblinka
death camp in Germany. Demjanjuk was identified by individual survivors of the
camp as “Ivan the Terrible,” a brutally sadistic Nazi war criminal. Demjanjuk’s
attorney, Mark O’Connor, felt that there were several features of his client’s
case that might strengthen defense arguments, including the fact that “false
memories” might be playing a role in the allegations since survivor memories of
Ivan were thirty five years old. Reflection will show that the case did not
revolve around any issue of “false memory,” much less around an issue that
survivor memory was even being questioned or presumed to be faulty.
Five
out of twenty-eight survivors of Treblinka identified Demjanjuk as Ivan.
However, such “identifications” would depend upon comparisons drawn between the
person survivors knew thirty-five years ago (Ivan), and the look of the
individual they saw before them in court at a later date (Demjanjuk).
Accordingly, the identification of Demjanjuk as Ivan even if erroneous does not necessarily involve mistaken memories of
what Ivan looked like thirty five years prior to survivor testimony. Where,
then, does the risk of false memories surface?
The
problem in the Demjanjuk case is not the possibility that what the memory of
what Ivan looked like thirty five years before is faulty, but only the belief that Demjanjuk thirty five years
later looks sufficiently like what Ivan should look like in the contemporary
time-frame to validate the positive identification. The error risk, then, is
not necessarily a memorial one; it is the failure to appropriately connect two
imaginings, or pictures: one of Demjanjuk in the here and now, and the other of
a future correct projection of how Ivan should look thirty-five years after
Treblinka. Consequently, the risk is a false positive identification based upon
a cognitive mistake in comparing a visual image-projection from the past with
the look of a present defendant. O’Connor’s case thus hinged on the integrity
of a visual time-projection, not on the possibility of “false memories”
contaminating testimony. That is, the time projection, a cognitive operation,
could have been faulty while the older memory was faithful. The exception here
would be the inability of the five accusers to identify Ivan as he looked 35
years prior to his trial by whatever faultless procedure such identification is
achieved. The foregoing discussion is not meant to diminish the importance of
myriad factors that have been shown to contaminate eyewitness identifications
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2005, p. 268)
Parties to current debates over
so-called “recovered memories” may sometimes fail to distinguish between (1)
claiming a (defendant, witch, suspect, patient) falsely remembered an event and (2) falsely believed an event occurred. In the former case, we recover
something justifiably classified as a “memory,” whereas in the latter case, we
merely suppose an event occurred through cognitive recasting of material
already available. Did the patient actually recover a “false memory” when, at
the prodding of her psychotherapist, she comes to reinterpret her current
distaste for bananas to past occasions of forced oral sex? Or is the
manipulation in question only one of belief, not memory distortion? The
question arises in contexts in which an individual may aver: “I don’t remember
the episode, but it must have occurred all the same.” Are the actual, but
inchoate memories of dark figures around a crib a “false memory” of a Satanic ritual
when this interpretation is placed upon them, or only a questionable reinterpretation of what a real memory
actually signifies?
To
complicate matters, a distinction can be drawn between a patient or suspect
whose cognitive mistake consists in misnaming
a mental event (e.g., in mislabeling as a “memory” what boils down to merely a
fresh interpretation or slant on a past event) and misidentifying an interpretation as a true memory (e.g., coming to
mistakenly believe that one’s interpretation of memory fragments was actually a
freshly recovered memory). The metamorphosis of benandanti tales into witch narratives was not a process by which
the former were mutated content-wise, only reclassified. Even as some scholars
insist that the confessions were of the (I) type, they were not this because of
being materially transformed in content, but because of reassignment to another
category of concern: heresy. Here, two kinds of errors are possible: holding a
(C) confession to be an (I) type, and claiming the conversion in question
involved thematic variation.
Despite these complications, once having
distinguished memory and belief and their combinatory forms, one is still
obliged to establish an evidential basis for applying a concept to a particular
case. Distinctions are one thing, but clinching the case that what therapists
occasionally do is to manipulate beliefs in contrast to facilitating memory
retrieval is quite another. In fact, we are not entitled to maintain any
position on the matter before studying individual cases. Current waves of
sloganeering over such concepts as repression—especially in advance of the
outcome of laboratory research and forensic studies—do a disservice to fair
minded attempts to investigate individual cases.
Return of the Repressed
While
many commentators single out Freud’s concept of repression as the chief
mischief-maker in the false memory controversy (Stannard, 1980; Ofshe &
Watters, 1994; Crews, 1995; 1998), it is also possible to view it, troublesome
or not, as a secondary inferential move. The primary error may have been the
assumption of a connection between assumed historical events and current
clinical patterns held to be their representative effect (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1982). In the absence of any memories of such events in patients who
exhibit certain patterns, the concept of repression rides piggy-back on the
connection. The notion of repression evaporates when there is no warrant for
positing the causal connection in question. For example, if it is not assumed
that a patient with bulimia or anorexia nervosa was sexually abused as a child,
there is no need to attribute the lack of any memory of such abuse to an
unconscious process responsible for the amnesia. Indeed, in an era in which
sexual abuse has been documented to be tragically frequent, the chance association between it and any number
of clinical syndromes may come to be perceived as causal, when it is only
adventitious.
Courts
in recent years have adopted the stance that testimony based upon a theory of
repressed memories of child sexual abuse and their recovery is forensically,
because theoretically, problematic. Jurisprudence on the inadmissibility of
testimony involving the recovery of repressed memories of sexual abuse was
instanced in Justice Groff’s ruling in State
v. Hungerford and Morahan, State of New Hampshire Nos. 94-S-45 through 47
and 93-S-1734 through 1936, September 14, 1994. Needless to say, some
researchers have held the skepticism surfacing in legal precedents does not go
far enough; it is the very notion of repression itself that still awaits
validation through scientific scrutiny (Holmes, 1972; 1974; Holmes &
Schallow, 1969). [iii]
Vagaries
of statistical association may result in imaginary connections between
childhood abuse and later clinical patterns held to be its markers. The lesson
to be drawn is not merely an academic one; during the late eighties and early
nineties in the United States a cottage industry sprang up based upon the idea
that current symptomatology is a hieroglyph of early patterns of sexual abuse.
Such manuals as the Incest Survivors
Aftereffects Checklist (Blume, 1991) were disseminated in order to alert
the otherwise troubled patient to symptomatic signs of early sexual abuse, from
“absent memories of early years” to “noise aversion.”
Actually,
the Ingram allegations of sexual abuse contain Victorian, as well as early modern thematic strains. It is
commonly supposed that intrafamilial sexual abuse, especially father-daughter
incest, was originally uncovered by Freud, but subsequently rejected by him in
favor of a theory of infantile fantasy. However, paradoxes abound in Freud’s
reportorial style. For example, despite Freud’s references to “reports” of
early seduction by his eighteen hysterical and obsessional patients, the actual
character of those disclosures remains unclear to this day. Freud wavered
between claiming he had actually obtained reports of infantile abuse from
patients and claiming they resisted the interpretations he attempted to force
upon them (Schimek, 1987; Macmillan, 1991).
Doubts
about the nature of the Freudian data-base of his thirteen (and subsequently
eighteen) patient caseload aside, there are other troublesome inconsistencies
in the canon (Thornton, 1983; Vetter, 1988; Israels & Schatzman, 1993). For
example, after his momentous reversal on the reality of seductions in 1897,
Freud subsequently reported that one of the reasons for his newer stance on
fantasy was that he hadn’t realized in the 1896 papers that seduction was only
a necessary, not sufficient condition for hysteria. In other words, Freud later
denied what he had presumably known earlier: that while all hysterics were
sexually abused as infants, not all persons so abused developed hysteria later.
The denial is belied by Freud’s comments in The
Aetiology of Hysteria, where he explicitly took pains to emphasize his
conviction that early trauma is sufficient to produce hysteria.
In
his later Autobiographical Study (Freud,
1925, pp. 33-35), Freud finds retrospective support for the so-called “father
etiology” in the 1895 cases he treated with Breuer (Breuer & Freud, 1895)
as well as the 1896 caseload. Paternal incest was therefore only later declared
to be the pathogen in the development of hysteria. However, there is little
basis in his earlier identification of perpetrators to justify the
retrospective attribution. Accordingly, while commentators like Masson (1984)
have raised concerns about Freud’s “betrayal” of the victims of paternal incest
in abandoning the Seduction Theory, no such pattern is referenced in the
original three seduction papers. In the thirteen patient caseload of the first
of those papers, over half the perpetrators are brothers. In the last of the
papers, most perpetrators are hired servants. In addition, one stranger and two
“close relatives” are cited (Esterson, 1993). While some critics have insisted
that Freud disguised the identity of fathers to protect Victorian sensibilities
(Gay, 1988, 94-95), the identification of seven brothers as sexual predators
suggests that maintaining veneers of social respectability was not uppermost in
Freud’s mind. The so-called “father etiology” hinted at by Freud only surfaces
within a year after the delivery of the last seduction paper, as well as in
subsequent letters to Wilhelm Fliess. 4
Witchcraft as a Transformational Exercise
Forms
of witchcraft in the early modern period dropping out of accounts of
contemporary Satanic cult activity, or SRA, are those that would nullify
plausibility had they been incorporated. Accordingly, recent cult narratives
have been conveniently updated. For citizens of the older time-frame,
assignment to novice witches of magical toads who served as their familiars was
not an unbelievable notion. But nothing of the kind survives in contemporary
accounts of Satanic cult activity.
Broadly,
differences between early modern and contemporary cult themes are those
associated with the limits of plausibility fixed by separate historical eras.
Yet criteria of plausibility may differ even within a given age. Examples are
cases of belief systems within contrasting world-views in contemporaneous
cultures. For example, when the existence of a demonic entity is part and
parcel of religious belief, Satan himself may put in an appearance at covens.
This was the case in the dramatic accounts of Michele Smith (Smith &
Pazder, 1980) and Lauren Stratford (Stratford, 1988). For those outside the
religious subculture, however, testimony involving fiery embodiments of the
Devil, his occult and sophomoric poetry, or tell-tale stigmata of his marks on
victims bodies (another early modern theme) are greeted with skepticism—and
amusement. For nonbelievers, such reports are canards, or else regarded as
transparent attempts at back-door proselytizing for versions of Christianity in
little danger of being demythologized (Bultmann, 1957).
For
those who take reports of contemporary cult involvement seriously, testimony of
cult victims occasions opportunities for salvaging perceived levels of reality.
This is accomplished by transforming the implausible layers of older thematic
material into updated narratives. Recasting the manifest layer into one
accommodating the belief system of the investigator is common in present day
exegeses. Thus, witches who transvected during the early modern period now “fly
through the air” at day care nurseries like those in the McMartin case (Wright,
1994, p. 74). Or else sectaries improvise “harnesses” or “trapezes” for the
purposes of casting doubt on the testimony of children. Cattle mutilations
without a visible spoor around the carcass of the dead animal are contrived not
through aerial transvection, but through “helicopter drops” (Kanaher, 1988)
chartered by the witches (whose ingenuity in leaving us perplexed over the
mechanics of the kill is rivaled only by the matchless stupidity of the
logistics involved).
Reconstructions
of the “real” trauma experienced by patients with Dissociative Identity
Disorder a.k.a. Multiple Personality Disorder (Putnam, 1989) whose alters
regale us with tales not handily assimilated to the world-view of the therapist
are likewise attempted. For example, Michele Smith’s revelations, explicitly
because they strain credulity for so many not easily convinced of a living
Devil, become for them intra-familial sexual abuse transmuted from the
archetypal layers of her account. On this formulation, the creative authorship
responsible for the metamorphosis of mundane abuse into mythological content is
the dissociative process.
Transformational
slants are hardly new. They have striking counterparts in traditions of
witchcraft scholarship of which Pedro de Valencia’s de-Satanization theory is
but one example (Henningsen, 1980). Pedro was a humanist and classical scholar
who was invited by the Inquisitor General of Spain, Bernardo de Sandoval y Rojas,
to contribute his views on the alleged outbreak of witchcraft in the Spanish
Basque during the early seventeenth century. One of his three hypotheses was
that the lurid tales of witch cult activity amounted to nothing more than a
gang of sociopaths indulging their appetites for the outré, merely. The hoary
motif of the pre-Christian, non-satanic fertility cult pace Murray (1921, 1934) and Gardner (1954) is another example of
the tradition. It survives as the benign “neo-pagan” or Wiccan witchcraft belief
system, an organized religious movement based upon a suppositious lineage
(Cohn, 1975). So mythologies have a way of accommodating to the convictions of
mythologists, not the other way around. Exuviating layers of implausibility in
order to reconstruct plausible historical scenarios is the warp and woof of
some witchcraft scholarship, especially that of the anthropological school
(Frazer, 1922).
In
all of this, there is no unwavering standard of plausibility from era to era.
Believability of narrative depends ultimately upon the vagaries of broader
believe-systems, and what they can absorb. What was believable for the early
modern citizen is the stuff of fairy-tales today. And what is a real,
malevolent being for contemporary fundamentalists is a product of whimsy or
superstition for the nonbeliever. Issues over the reality of witchcraft in
yesteryear may as they do today transcend issues arising from the inherent
ambiguities of experience. They also derive from vastly different ways of
looking at the world, which might be why Satanism never goes away—nor, like
comets, stay the same on return visits.
*Dr.
Begelman is a clinical psychologist and neuropsychologist in private practice
in Connecticut. He is the past theater critic for the Danbury News-Times and drama and film
critic for The Citizen News of New Fairfield.
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[i] The
belief in causal connections between a ritual and external happenstance is the
foundation of all magical practices. The latter may be maintained by a partial
reinforcement effect (Skinner & Ferster, 1957), accounting for the survival
of such practices in the sometime confirmation of an apparent connection.
Amulets, talismans, cauls, astrological signs, incantations, prayers, magnets,
relics, and crystals thus continue to be relied on when their occasional
seeming success in bringing about a desired effect overshadows the greater
frequency of their failures. The latter, of course, are largely ignored in the
flush of statistically random hits.
[ii] The
Night Battles, originally published as I
Benandanti: Stegonerie e Culti A e Seicento in 1966, was translated into
English in 1982 by Anne and John Tedeschi.
[iii] In
recent years, there has been an outpouring of broad scale attacks on the entire
psychoanalytic theoretical edifice. (Nagel, 1959; Cioffi, 1974; Erwin, 1980;
Grünbaum, 1984; Esterson, 1993; Crews, 1986; 1995; 1998; Macmillan, 1997).
Curiously, these have been authored by humanities scholars some of whom have
been doubtlessly soured on their former partialities to this kind of
theorizing. Experimental psychologists, on the other hand, have been less vocal
about the enthusiasm, having largely renounced psychoanalytic theory from its
inception. The disappointed are quicker to remonstrate than the wearied.
4
Mention of paternal incest occurs in the 1896 letter of 12/6, and the
1897 letters of 1/3, 1/12, 1/24, 2/8, 4/28, 5/2, 5/31, 6/22, and 12/12
(Masson, 1985). Its introduction—as well as its later repudiation--in all
likelihood coincided with theory-driven surmises, not actual “discoveries”
Freud made in the Seduction Theory days of 1896.